Limiting Limited Liability by Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci
Limiting Limited Liability 
Giuseppe Dari-Mattiacci
Amsterdam Center for Law and Economics
Abstract
Limited liability may result in inefficient accident prevention, because a relevant portion of
the expected harm is externalized on victims. This paper shows that under some restrictive
conditions further limiting liability by means of a liability cap can improve caretaking.
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1.   Introduction 
Limited liability is often blamed for making it too easy for firms to take risks that, if 
materialized, are externalized on unaware victims. The most troubling aspect concerns liability 
in torts, when accident victims are not part of any contract with the damaging firm, and hence 
cannot negotiate an appropriate level of precaution. Environmental accidents provide many 
examples of these types of eventualities. 
Limited liability usually results in insufficient caretaking (Summers 1983; Shavell 1986). 
However, Beard (1990) shows that limited liability may result in excessive caretaking, which in 
turn causes some otherwise solvent firms (Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest, forthcoming) to be 
bankrupt in the case of an accident. This paradoxical result is explained by noting that a 
potentially insolvent firm receives a precaution subsidy when it makes monetary precautionary 
expenditures. 
In fact, when precaution costs amount to a monetary investment (e.g. a firm improves 
funding for its safety division), precautionary expenditures reduce the amount of the assets that 
are available for damage compensation. After making precautionary expenditures, the firm is left 
with a smaller amount of assets, and thus is exposed to a reduced potential liability. Because 
more precautions result in less liability, precautionary expenditures may be said to be partially 
subsidized by the consequent reduction in expected liability, possibly yielding to higher levels of 
precautions than would be socially optimal. With non-monetary precautions, this scenario would 
not arise, as the firm’s ex post liability would be independent of its ex ante precaution decisions. 
Commentators often advocate piercing the veil of corporate liability,
1 shifting the liability 
burden to vicarious or third parties
2 or imposing stringent financial requirements
3 as a possible 
solution to the problems caused by limited liability. Without opposing this view, this paper 
suggests that the reverse policy could also be socially desirable, showing that further limiting a 
firm’s limited liability, by capping the maximum damage award,
4 may improve precaution 
incentives and, consequently, social welfare. Section 2. contains the basic model of potentially 
insolvent firms with monetary precaution costs. Section 3.  shows that liability caps may 
improve social welfare. Section 4. discusses the optimal setting of the liability cap. Section 5.  
provides a conclusion. 
2.   Model: firm’s assets and precaution 
Building on Shavell (1986), we analyze the precaution decision of a risk-neutral limited liability 
firm with (exogenously determined)
5 assets a, which operates under strict liability.
6 The firm’s 
                                                           
1 Hansmann and Kraakman (1991); Leebron (1991). See also Beard (1990, p. 633). 
2 Sykes (1981); Kornhauser (1982); Dari-Mattiacci and Parisi (2003); Arlen and MacLeod (2005). 
3 Shavell (2005). 
4 Boyd and Ingberman (1994) are the first to advocate non-compensatory damages as a solution to the dilution of 
incentives caused by insolvency. However, they employ a model in which precaution expenditures do not reduce 
the tortfeasor’s liability, and hence discuss a different set of problems. 
5 Boyd and Ingberman (1999) study insolvency when assets are endogenous to the model. 
6 The negligence rule is also advocated as a solution to the problem (Summers 1983; Shavell 1986), although it 
solves the problem only if the standard of care is perfectly anticipated ex ante (Craswell and Calfee 1986). G. DARI-MATTIACCI – LIMITING LIMITED LIABILITY 
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precaution lowers the probability of a single harmful accident involving victims who are 
strangers
7 to the firm and cannot take any form of precaution in order to protect themselves from 
harm (e.g. a chemical plant explosion). All functions are continuously differentiable to any 
desired order. Let: 
x  =  the precaution cost, x ≥ 0; 
p(x)  =  probability of an accident, 0 < p(x) < 1, p’ < 0, p” > 0; 
h  =  magnitude of the harm, h > 0; 
c  =  the liability cap, c ≤ h; 
a  =  the assets, a > 0. 
The social objective is to minimize the standard (social) cost function: 
x h x p x S + = ) ( ) (  (1)
Let  x*  denote the (unique) level of precaution that minimizes (1) and let it be positive; x* 
represents the first-best level of precaution in the absence of limited liability. The firm has 
limited assets and, following Beard (1990), its precautionary expenditures are monetary, and 
hence every dollar spent in precaution reduces the net assets available for liability by the same 
amount. Unlike this literature, we also assume that there is a limit (the liability cap) on the 
amount of damages that victims will be legally entitled to recover from the firm in the case of an 
accident. Because of the liability cap, the firm pays damages equal to c ≤ h, that is, the damage 
award may be less than the harm. 
As a result, if an accident occurs, the firm will pay the (possibly capped) damage award c if 
his remaining assets a – x (that is, the amount of assets left after making precautionary 
expenditures x) are larger than (or equal to) c; the firm will pay a – x if its remaining assets are 
less than c. Thus, the firm’s liability costs are as follows: 
{ } x x a c x p x L + − = , min ) ( ) (   (2)
If c = h, we have the case analyzed by Beard (1990), in which it can be proved that the level of 
precaution taken by the firm may be higher than x* (e.g.: when a = h + x
*). Some firms, which 
would be solvent had they taken the socially optimal level of precaution (in the example, a – x
* 
= h), may be induced to take a higher level of precaution, which is the only cause of their 
bankruptcy and lowers social welfare. 
3.   Analysis: liability cap and precaution 
We will now show that by lowering c it is possible to improve social welfare. From (2), the 
firm’s liability minimization problem can be written as follows: 
[] ( ) [ ] { } x x a x p x c x p
x x + − + ) ( min , ) ( min min   (3)
The problem is convex in x. In order to determine the pattern of the firm’s precaution as a 
function of c, note that the first part in (3) depicts the firm’s minimization problem when the firm 
is solvent, that is when c ≥ a – x. In this case, the firm is able to pay the (truncated) damage 
award. For convenience, let xc be the level of precaution that minimizes the firm’s liability in this 
case. The second part in (3) depicts the liability costs of an insolvent firm, when c < a – x. 
                                                           
7 That is, the victims cannot negotiate the level of precaution with the firm. G. DARI-MATTIACCI – LIMITING LIMITED LIABILITY 
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Let xa–x denote the level of the firm’s precaution that minimizes the firm’s liability in this 
case. Note that xa–x is constant in c and, by the Implicit Function Theorem, increasing in a. On 
the contrary, xc is increasing in c but constant in a. Therefore, comparing (1) and (3), we have xc 
≤ x*, as long as c ≤ h. The infra-marginal decision between solvency (taking xc) and insolvency 
(taking xa–x) depends upon which of these two possibilities yields the lowest total cost for the 
firm:
8 
( ) x a x a x a c c x x a x p x c x p − − − + − <> + ) ( ) (  (4)




) ( 1 ) (
x a
x a x a c c
c x p
x x p x c x p
a
−
− − − − +
=  
By the Envelop Theorem, p(xc)c + xc is an increasing function of c; thus, ac also increases in c. 
Therefore, by lowering c below h  the firm can be induced to take xc instead of xa–x. This 
improves social welfare as long as: 
x a x a c c x h x p x h x p − − + < + ) ( ) ( 
Figure 1 shows the pattern of the firm’s precaution with and without a liability cap. 
                                                           
8 For this solution algorithm, see Dari-Mattiacci and De Geest (forthcoming). 
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4.   Policy implications: the optimal setting of the liability cap 
In a world with only one firm, the optimal c ≤ h depends upon the firm’s assets a. In general, c 
should be set as high as possible, since the social cost decreases in c, but not too high, since we 
want the firm to prefer xc to xa–x. Such a level of c satisfies a strict equality in (4) and is an 
increasing function of a. Figure 2 depicts the impact of such a liability cap on the social cost. Let 
c^=c^(a) denote this level of c. In addition, let a^ be such that S(xc(c^(a^))) = S(xa–x(a^)). 
To the right of x*,
9 S(xa–x(a)) increases as a increases, since xa–x > x* moves further away 
from x*. On the contrary, S(xc(c^(a))) decreases as a increases, since xc < x* moves closer to x*. 
It follows that for a ≥ a^ the social cost is lower when the firm takes xc than when it takes xa–x. 
On the contrary, for a < a^ the social cost is lower when the firm takes xa-x than when it takes xc. 
At the other end of the spectrum, when a ≥ ac=h, the firm takes x* if no liability cap is applied, 
while it takes xa–x when a < ac=h and no liability cap is applied.  Therefore, in the range a^ < a < 
ac=h the optimal liability cap is c^(a) < h, since the firm’s precaution can be improved by making 
it take xc instead of xa–x. Outside this range c = h is optimal, either because the firm already has 
incentives to take x* (upper end) or because xa–x results in lower social costs than any feasible xc 
(lower end). 
                                                           
9 To the left of x* a liability cap would only worsen caretaking. 
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Let us now consider a world in which many firms exist with different assets, where the liability 
cap affects all firms at the same time. Given a distribution of firm types between a and a, with 
density f(a) ≥ 0 over the relevant region and cumulative distribution F(a), with F(a) = 0 and 





















a dF c x S a dF a x S ) ( ) ( min  
where firms with assets below ac take xa–x, while firms with assets above ac take xc. A change in 
c affects the level of precaution taken by the latter group of firms and, at the same time, also 
affects the composition of both groups, since ac varies with c. Assuming convexity, the optimal 
setting of the liability cap solves the following FCO: 
[] () () ( ) []
dc
da
c a f c a x S c x S c a F
dc
c x dS c
c c x a c c
c )) ( ( )) ( ( )) ( ( 1
)) ( (
− − = −   (5)
Expression (5) is readily interpreted. The LHS can be seen as the marginal benefit of raising the 
liability cap, thereby increasing the levels of precautions taken by all firms to the right of ac. 
Recall that by raising c we bring xc closer to x*, thereby reducing the social cost. The RHS 
depicts instead the marginal benefit of lowering the liability cap: the marginal firm (with assets 
equal to ac) is induced to take xc < x* instead of xa–x > xc, in so doing, possibly reducing the 
social cost. The optimal liability cap balances these opposite effects and depends upon the 
distribution of the firm types. 
5.   Conclusions 
A potentially insolvent firm may be induced to take more precaution than is socially optimal. 
This is due to an implicit precaution subsidy generated by monetary precautionary expenditures, 
which reduce the amount of the firm’s assets exposed to liability. This increment in precaution 
increases the total social cost of accidents. We have shown that capping the firm’s liability can 
reduce both the firm’s precaution and the social cost of accidents. 
Liability caps are limits on the firm’s liability exposure set by law. Contrary to the firm’s 
assets, liability caps are independent from the firm’s precautionary expenditures. An increase in 
the firm’s precaution reduces the firm’s assets but does not affect the liability cap. For this 
reason, liability caps are not vulnerable to the perverse incentives created by monetary 
precautionary expenditures and can effectively counter excessive precaution, thereby giving the 
opportunity to improve social welfare. 
In a world in which many firms exist with different assets, liability caps come at some costs, 
as they also lower the level of precaution of some solvent firms. Optimal liability cap policies 
balance these costs against the benefits we have emphasized above in this paper. G. DARI-MATTIACCI – LIMITING LIMITED LIABILITY 
  7
References 
Arlen, J.H., and MacLeod, W.B. (2005) “Beyond Master-Servant: A Critique of Vicarious 
Liability” in Exploring Tort Law by M.S. Madden, Ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Beard, T.R. (1990) “Bankruptcy and Care Choice” Rand Journal of Economics 21, 626-34. 
Boyd, J., and Ingberman, D.E. (1994) “Noncompensatory Damages and Potential Insolvency” 
Journal of Legal Studies 23, 895-910. 
Boyd, J., and Ingberman, D.E. (1999) “Do Punitive Damages Promote Deterrence?” 
International Review of Law and Economics 19, 47-68. 
Craswell, R., and Calfee, J.E. (1986) “Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards” in Journal 
of Law, Economics, and Organization 2, 279–303. 
Dari-Mattiacci, G., and De Geest, G. (forthcoming) “When Will Judgment Proof Injurers 
Take too much Precaution?” International Review of Law and Economics. 
Dari-Mattiacci, G., and Parisi, F. (2003) “The Cost of Delegated Control: Vicarious Liability, 
Secondary Liability and Mandatory Insurance” International Review of Law and 
Economics 23, 453-475. 
Hansmann, H., and Kraakman, R. (1991) “Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for 
Corporate Torts” Yale Law Journal 100, 1879-1934. 
Kornhauser, L.A. (1982) “An Economic Analysis of the Choice between Enterprise and 
Personal Liability for Accidents” California Law Review 70, 1345-1392. 
Leebron, D.W. (1991) “Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors” Columbia Law Review 
91, 1565-1650. 
Shavell, S. (1986) “The Judgment Proof Problem” International Review of Law and 
Economics 6, 45-58. 
Shavell, S. (2005) “Financial Responsibility Rules: Minimum Asset Requirements and 
Compulsory Liability Insurance” RAND Journal of Economics 36, 63-77. 
Summers, J. (1983) “The Case of the Disappearing Defendant: An Economic Analysis” 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132, 145-85. 
Sykes, A.O. (1981) “An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of 
Agency” Yale Law Journal 91, 168-206. 